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THE REAL ISSUES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Alex Kozinski *
The Canons of Judicial Ethics remind me of the old joke about the
drunk who's crawling around on all fours under a lamp-post one night.
A policeman comes along and asks him his business and the drunk
explains that he's looking for a lost quarter. So the policeman offers to
help and pretty soon they're both crawling around looking for the coin.
After about a half hour of this, the policeman gets fed up and asks: "Are
you sure you lost the quarter around here?" "Oh, no," answers the drunk,
"I dropped it over in the alley, but it's too dark to look there."
So, too, it is with the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The Canons focus
on the tensions and potential conflicts that are most easily detected by an
outside observer. For example, pretty much everyone agrees that a judge
should not sit in judgment on a case on appeal if he participated in the
decision below.' Similarly, everyone agrees that a judge may not sit in
judgment in a case where he participated as a party or a lawyer. 2 Of
course, those are just two of the most obvious examples; we have plenty
of rules and precedents saying that a judge may not participate in a case
where doing so would create the appearance of impropriety.
I should mention at the outset that I'm not a fan of this approach to
judicial ethics, nor do I believe that it's necessary or inevitable. Take the
two examples I've given. As you will recall, in the early days of the
Republic the justices rode circuit, and some of the cases they heard in
*

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

1. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(a) (1990).

2. See id.Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (former lawyer), Canon 3(E)(l)(d)(i)-(ii) (party and current
lawyer).
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the lower courts would later come before the Supreme Court, so they
occasionally reviewed their own decisions. 3 No one thought this was
much of a problem. As to the second example, consider Marbury v.
Madison.4 The issue that led to the landmark opinion in that case arose
because a commission signed by President Adams, and counter-signed
by the Secretary of State, wasn't delivered before Adams left office and
Jefferson became President.5 The Secretary of State later said that he
was really sorry not to have delivered the commission, but he was much
too busy. 6 Small wonder he was busy: He was holding down two jobsSecretary of State and Chief Justice. This was, of course, Marshall
himself.7 So Marshall ruled in an important case where he was involved
in the underlying dispute.8
The approach to disqualification reflected in Marbury v. Madison
and cases of that era was based on the common law notion that an
integral part of the judge's job is to set aside whatever personal interests
and biases he might have, and to decide cases impartially on the merits. 9
If a judge felt that he could not set aside personal biases in a particular
case, he would recuse himself.'0 But the primary obligation was to
summon the internal fortitude to rise above personal considerations and
decide cases impartially on the merits.
I'm not going to argue here that we ought to go back to a regime
where a judge's ethical obligation consists entirely of setting aside his
personal biases and interests, no matter how serious a conflict he might
appear to have. What I do want to point out is that the modem approach,
with its focus on appearance of impropriety, overlooks the most
frequent and important ethical issues judges face. Many of these issues
are dull, so get ready to be bored. Nonetheless, they represent the bread
and butter of judicial life.

3. See Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of CircuitRiding, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2003).

4. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. See id. at 138.
6. See Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the
Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607, 625 (2001).
7. See id at 609-10 n.7. Professor Bloch hypothesizes that Marshall's involvement in setting
up the case went far deeper than that. Her article is a great piece of historical detective work; well
worth reading,
8. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 343, 350 (2003)
(criticizing Marshall for his participation in Marbury).
9. The parties, in fact, could not challenge a judge's decision to sit on a case. See WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, ESQ. 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (William S. Hein & Co.,

Inc., reprint of 1st ed. 1992) (1768).
10.

See id.
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The first ethical issue I want to examine has to do with work
allocation-the amount of time and effort judges spend on cases,
particularly small cases. " Judicial caseloads have increased
tremendously over the last few decades, and they continue to do so.
When I graduated from law school in 1975 I clerked for the Ninth
Circuit, and at that time each judge disposed on the merits of
approximately 210 cases per year. 12 In 2002, the number stood at 492
cases per active judge, and the Ninth Circuit is far from the busiest court
of appeals in the country. 13 That dubious honor goes to the Eleventh
Circuit, which decided 843 cases per judge in 2002.14 Just imagine what
that means: Every judge of the Eleventh Circuit signed off on the merits
disposition of 2.3 cases a day, every day of the year-weekends and
holidays included.
Add to this the fact that not all cases are created equal. Most
judicial work is routine and dull, involving issues that are of no
consequence to anyone other than the parties. Only a few cases raise
difficult and interesting issues-the kind of issues that make for an
important judicial opinion. When lawyers seek appointment to judicial
office, they generally think of the interesting cases as the core of judicial
work; none I know seeks judicial office so he can spend his days, nights,
weekends and holidays slogging through an unending stack of routine,
fact-intensive and largely (in the grand scheme of things)
inconsequential cases.
Human nature being what it is, there is a strong tendency to devote
a disproportionate amount of judicial time to the big cases and to give
short shrift to the small ones. There's actually a lot to be said for this.
Preparing a precedential opinion requires a significant amount of time
because such an opinion not only decides the dispute between the
parties, but also sets the course of the law for innumerable cases to
come. So you are justified in spending most of your time on the big
cases, because you really do have a serious responsibility: A rushed and
11. Much of the background on work allocation and internal functioning of the court comes
from my personal observations. For further discussion on this topic, see Howard T. Markey, On the
Present Deteriorationof the FederalAppellate Process: Never Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L.
REV. 371 (1988). From 1972 to 1982, Judge Markey was Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals; from 1982 to 1990, he was the first Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United States Courts: Markey, Howard
=
Thomas, at http://air.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid 1479 (last visited August 16, 2004).
12.

See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Management Statistics for United States Courts

1980, at 9 (1980).
13. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2002 Federal Court Management Statistics, at 20
(2002).
14.

Id. at 24.
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sloppy opinion can cause major problems for a lot of people down the
road. Yet, the small cases, too, have a legitimate claim to a fair share of
judicial time and attention.
An important part of the judicial function thus consists of allocating
one's time between the big and small cases-and this is a decision
judges make almost implicitly and with no possibility of complaint by
the parties affected. In fact, no one knows precisely how judges allocate
their time among the cases assigned to them, but the risk that small and
seemingly unimportant cases will be given insufficient attention is everpresent.
People might assume, if they think about such issues at all, that
there's no real problem-because most cases are, in fact, easy. This
points to an important paradox in the process of judging. In one sense,
most cases are very easy. In a different sense, though, there are no easy
cases. Most cases are easy in that, if you took any three judges in the
federal judiciary, no matter how diverse their judicial philosophies, and
asked them to look closely at the record, the applicable caselaw and the
arguments of the parties, you'd get a unanimous result every time. 15 But
all cases are difficult in the sense that it takes time and attention to get to
the point of decision. You have to make sure you know the record and
the arguments; you have to be confident that you have the latest caselaw
and understand exactly what it says. All of this takes a fair degree of
concentration and effort, even in the easy cases.
Most of the time-nine times out of ten, maybe more-when
you're done, you reach the obvious result. And so it seems almost
pointless to go to the trouble again and again and again, only to come up
with the result you could have guessed from the beginning. It's a bit like
banging your head against a padded wall. But then, once in a while, it
turns out that what looked like an easy case is actually quite difficult,
because of a small fact buried in the record, or a footnote in a recent
opinion. After more than two decades of judging I have found no way to
separate the sheep from the goats, except by taking a close look. But
how close a look any one judge takes in a particular case is strictly a
matter of the judge's own conscience. It's one of the embedded ethical
issues that no one ever talks about.
A closely related issue is the tendency to delegate essential aspects
of the judicial function to staff. 16 At the time I clerked, each federal

15. See Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 856 (1991).
16. See Markey, supra note 11, at 378-79.
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circuit judge had one secretary and two law clerks. Then, in the early
1980s, the staff complement was increased to five, made up of two
secretaries and three law clerks. Sometime in the 1990s, judges were
allowed to substitute a law clerk for one of the secretarial positions; I
believe most circuit judges take advantage of this option, so that now
judges generally have four clerks. In the Eleventh Circuit, by special
dispensation, judges have been allocated an additional clerk, apparently
because they have not sought the increase in judicial positions that their
caseload would justify.
During the same quarter-century, there has been a steep increase in
the number of central staff attorneys. In 1975, our court had a skeletal
central staff whose function was largely to process motions; all merits
cases were handled in chambers by judges and their elbow clerks. Today
we have something like seventy staff attorneys, all located in our
headquarters in San Francisco, and they process approximately forty
percent of the cases in which we issue a merits ruling. When I say
process, I mean that they read the briefs, review the record, research the
law and prepare a proposed disposition, which they then present to a
panel of three judges during a process we call "oral screening"--oral,
because the judges don't see the briefs in advance, and because they
generally rely on the staff attorney's oral description of the case in
deciding whether to sign on to the proposed disposition. An oral
screening panel meets for two or three days each month and during that
time disposes of a hundred and fifty cases, sometimes more.
The increase in caseload coupled with the proliferation of staff
creates a constant temptation for judges to give away essential pieces of
their job.17 The pressure is most severe in the small and seemingly
routine cases, especially those handled through the screening process.
After you dispose of a few dozen such cases on a screening calendar,
your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders and the urge to say okay to
whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible. The
temptation is heightened by the fact that the staff attorneys who present
these cases are very experienced and usually get it right. It often takes a
frantic act of will to continue questioning successive staff attorneys
about each case, or to insist on reading key parts of the record or
controlling precedent to ensure that the case is decided by the three
judges whose names appear in the caption, not by a single staff attorney.

17. See id.
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A similar temptation exists as to the bigger cases. Writing opinions
is a difficult, time-consuming, exacting process.18 It is a reality of
current judicial life that few judges draft their own opinions from
scratch. Generally, the judge will give instructions about how a case is to
be decided and what points the opinion should make, but the initial
drafting is almost always left to a clerk. The draft opinion, when it lands
on the judge's desk some weeks later, is generally pretty good-after all,
we pick only the best law students as clerks. On reading the opinion, the
judge may be able to detect any obvious flaws in reasoning, and he'll
certainly be able to make some word edits. But this casual read is a far
cry from the time and effort required to study the opinion closely,
deconstruct its arguments, examine key portions of the record and
carefully parse the precedents-all the things a judge must do before he
can call the opinion his own. Nevertheless, if the judge chooses merely
to fiddle a bit with an opinion drafted by his clerk and then circulate it,
nobody is the wiser. And we do occasionally get opinions circulated that
look like they were written by someone a year out of law school with no
adult supervision. The only guarantee one can have that judges are not
rubber-stamping their law clerks' work product is each judge's sense of
personal responsibility.
Let me now turn to the issue that has been alluded to several times
already by Professors Fried, 19 Freedman 20 and Butler, 21 among others.
I'm talking about the cases where a dispassionate application of the law
to the facts leads to a result that the judge doesn't like. I want to put
aside the close case where the law is murky enough so the judge might
find a principled way to reach a result he considers just. 22 I also want to
put aside the controversial case where the morally offended judge
applies the correct law but then makes noise to spark political efforts to
change the law. 23 Rather, I pose the more mundane-but far more
common--case where the law is fair, no one in particular has an axe to
18. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1371-76 (1995) (discussing the difficulties of judicial rhetoric);
Fred A. Bernstein, How to Write it Right, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 42, 81.
19. Professor Charles Fried, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law Legal Ethics

Conference-Judging Judges' Ethics (Sept. 14, 2003) (videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review).
20. Professor Monroe H. Freedman co-directed the Conference and gave welcoming remarks.
21. Professor Paul Butler, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law Legal Ethics
Conference-Judging Judges' Ethics (Sept. 14, 2003) (videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review).
22. See Paul Butler, Should Radicals Be Judges, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1203 (2004) (based on
Conference talk).
23. See Bob Egelko, High Court Justice Crusadesfor Mercy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2003, at
A2 (describing Justice Kennedy's speech calling for the elimination of mandatory-minimum
sentences).
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grind, but the judge believes that the result dictated by precedent is
unjust.
Most people would say that the judge in that situation must put
aside his personal feelings about the result and decide the case in
accordance with the law. But I also think that most would agree that the
judge faces a conflict of obligations-the obligation to apply the law
impartially, and the obligation to do justice. We generally reconcile
these obligations by saying that justice is served when judges apply the
law impartially, regardless of the personal views of the decision-maker.24
So far so good. But what if a judge comes across a case where a
straight-forward application of the law leads not merely to a result he
doesn't like, but to what he believes is a shocking injustice? May a judge
bend the rule of law to avoid a truly monstrous result? Might he have an
ethical obligation to do so?
In theory, it's easy enough to say that a judge may never bend the
rules to avoid a particular result, no matter how bad. But consider this
example: You are reviewing a criminal appeal where a young man has
been convicted of murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole. You examine the record and find that the evidence linking the
defendant to the crime is quite flimsy-witness identifications are
tentative and contradictory, and there is no circumstantial evidence
whatsoever. The only solid piece of evidence supporting the conviction
is what is known as a jailhouse confession-the testimony of an inmate
who shared a cell with the defendant while he was awaiting trial, and
who swears that the defendant confessed to the murder (a confession the
defendant denies making). You read this testimony closely and find it
transparently unconvincing. It contains no authenticating information
that the witness could only have obtained from the real killer. And, of
course, the witness has been given a sweetheart plea bargain in exchange
for his testimony.
Applying the rules of appellate review in an objective manner, you
would have to affirm the conviction. After all, the jury is the trier of fact
and it was entitled to return a guilty verdict based on the jailhouse
confession alone. Yet, what if you believe, to a moral certainty, that the
confession is a fabrication and that the defendant didn't do it? Must you
affirm the conviction and let a young man you believe to be innocent

24. See, e.g., Charles Fried, A Meditation on the First Principles of Judicial Ethics, 32
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1227 (2004) (based on Conference talk) ("Justice is judging according to the law
and the judge who ignores (more rightly, defies) law to do what he thinks is justice, acts unjustly.").
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spend the next eighty years, or whatever time is left to him on earth,
locked up in a ten-foot by fifteen-foot cell?
Or, if you're not moved by this hypothetical, consider the case
where the defendant is convicted of multiple brutal murders of small
children-crimes of which he is doubtless guilty. And let's say you're
convinced that, if the defendant is released, he will surely do it again and
again. As it happens, however, this defendant has a slam-dunk argument
that the prosecution's entire case against him rested on the product of a
technical procedural violation. In such circumstances, do you have an
obligation to set the defendant free and possibly condemn unknown
children to death by torture, or may
you put justice above the law and
25
find a way to affirm the conviction?
I used to think that questions like these had an easy answer-you
apply the law conscientiously and don't worry about the consequences.
But I'm no longer sure. I now wonder whether this isn't false modesty, a
kind of hubris: I will accept whatever result the law calls for, no matter
how much it hurts somebody else. A troubled conscience is certainly not
pleasant, but the real-life, brutal consequences of an unjust judicial
decision are suffered by others-the innocent kid who wastes his life in
a prison cell, or the future victims of the slasher released on a
technicality.
I am reminded that among the most reviled participants in the Third
Reich's persecution of Jews and other minorities were the German
judges who enforced the Nuremberg laws. These judges claimed as
justification that they were simply applying the law.26 Our collective
assessment seems to be that the judges shirked their responsibility-that
they should have used their power and authority to undermine unjust
laws. Do American judges have a similar ethical obligation? I'm not
going to suggest an answer here because it's a tough question. Instead,
I'll simply point out that this is the kind of ethical question that matters,
that makes a difference. It arises all the time and yet the Canons of
Judicial Ethics have no answers.
25.

Cf, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415-29 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)

(arguing that the decision of the Supreme Court to overturn the conviction of an admitted child

murderer because of a Mirandaviolation was "intolerable in any society which purports to call itself
...organized"). Chief Justice Burger may well have been prescient. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 449-50 (1984) (upholding, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the conviction of Williams
after retrial).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Altstoetter, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1, 1014 (1951)

(quoting defendant Rothenberger: "'The judge is on principle bound by the law. The laws are the
orders of the Fuehrer."').
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Lots of ethical questions like these pop up every day in the course
of judging but don't show up anywhere in the Canons. Here are a few
more examples, briefly stated:
* Do you have an ethical obligation to dissent, even if you know it
won't change anybody's mind and will probably anger your colleagues?
- If you've decided a case in favor of a criminal defendant who is
incarcerated pending the outcome of his appeal, do you have a
responsibility to move the case ahead of other work so he will be
released more quickly? Or, if you're going to rule that the giant
corporation can evict the old lady because she can't pay the rent, is it
okay to put that case at the bottom of the work pile and not get to it until
the snow melts?
- If you are writing an opinion and there are inconvenient facts in
the record, may you simply leave them out (as lawyers sometimes do),
or do you have an obligation to mention them?.
- In finding against a party, may you caricature the party's
argument (as lawyers sometimes do) to make it seem less persuasive?
- Is it okay to swap votes with another judge-say vote in favor of
taking en banc a case he's interested in, in exchange for having him vote
with you in a case you're interested in?
- There's a death penalty case, a second petition. The panel votes to
let the execution go forward, the en banc vote is tied and you are the last
to vote, so your vote is going to be decisive. You are convinced that the
Supreme Court will never take the case, so voting "no" means the
petitioner will be dead in forty-eight hours. In deciding how to vote, may
you take into account the life-and-death consequences of your decision,
or are you ethically bound to approach the case as if it were about
arbitrability of employment contracts?
- Large and important cases create their own issues. Would anyone
today remember John Sirica, Harold Green and Thomas Pennfield
Jackson if they had held, respectively, that President Nixon did not need
to turn over the White House Tapes, that AT&T did not need to be
broken up and that Microsoft was not a monopolist? I'm not saying that
Judges Sirica, Green and Jackson made their decisions for improper
reasons; I'm saying only that judges are well aware that certain
outcomes are far more likely than others to gain them personal notoriety
and prestige. Judge Sirica, who before Watergate led an undistinguished
judicial career and was known around the D.C. District courthouse as
"Maximum John" for his harsh sentencing practices, 27 became Time
27. See PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 651 (Rev'd ed. 1991).
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Magazine's Man of the Year for 1973.28 That's a lot of temptation right
there, yet it is seldom recognized as creating an ethical dilemma.
- You are a federal district judge. Naturally, you hope to be
elevated to the court of appeals, and some friends in high places have
intervened with the White House on your behalf; it looks like you have a
good chance of getting the promotion. As you're waiting for the political
process to run its course, you preside over a high-profile criminal case
where the defendant is convicted, and you have to impose the sentence.
You review the presentence report and various other materials, and you
conclude that the defendant is entitled to a substantial downward
departure from the range calculated according to the Sentencing
Guidelines. The Assistant United States Attorney, though, vehemently
opposes any downward departure. In determining the defendant's
sentence, may you take into account that the Attorney General of the
States
United States has instituted a policy requiring all Assistant United
29
Attorneys to report downward departures by district judges?
Every magistrate judge is a district judge in waiting; every district
judge is a circuit judge in waiting; every circuit judge is an associate
justice in waiting; and every associate justice is a chief justice in
waiting. Every state judge wants to be re-elected and, hopefully,
promoted-perhaps within the state judicial hierarchy, perhaps into the
federal judiciary. How does a judge reconcile his personal ambitions
with the requirements of principled application of the law and sensitivity
to individual justice? The Canons of Judicial Ethics don't begin to
address this issue. Indeed, they don't recognize it as an ethical issue at
all, yet the temptation to decide cases in a way that will please those in
the political process who have the power to appoint, retain and promote
judges is one of the most ubiquitous moral hazards facing members of
the judiciary.
How serious are these issues? Let me explain it this way: I file a
financial disclosure report every year, telling the world what assets I
own, just so litigating parties can confirm that I did not-God forbidsit in a case involving a corporation whose stock I hold. I find this
requirement a nuisance and a bit dangerous and intrusive, because it
discloses things about me and my family, and our assets, that I would

28.
29.
Edward
2003, at

See Judge John J. Sirica: Standing Firmfor the Primacyof Law, TIME, Jan. 7, 1974, at 8.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.170(B); see also
Walsh & Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Orders Tally of Lighter Sentences, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
Al.
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prefer to keep private. But I file the report
because it's considered an
30
important safeguard of judicial integrity.
Yet I can't imagine that I could possibly be tempted to change my
vote in a case because I own stock in one of the parties. I don't claim a
special virtue in this, if virtue means resisting temptation. What I'm
saying is, I wouldn't be tempted. If money were important to me, I'd be
in private practice and, in a month or a week-maybe in an hour-I
would make much more than my one hundred shares of AT&T could
possibly change in value based on my vote in a case. The idea that I
would give up my honest judgment in a case for a few dollars is beyond
silly-it's ludicrous and insulting. So many of the things contained
within the Canons, the ones most talked about, are wholly irrelevant in
practice. They make no difference at all.
But the internal temptations that I described above are ones I
confront every day. Giving short shrift to small cases, signing on to the
work of staff and calling it my own, bending the law to reach a result I
like-and the dozens of other ways in which I feel the pressure to do
something unethical, yet wholly undetectable by anyone other than meall these temptations I must fight off many times every single day.
My problem with the appearance of impropriety standard isn't so
much that it's bad on its own terms, though I think it probably is. Rather,
the standard promotes the wrong idea-that in order to keep judges from
acting unethically, ethical rules must prevent judges from appearing to
act unethically. It also seems to suggest the converse: that if judges
appear to be acting ethically, they probably are. Nothing could be further
from the truth. A judge can appear to act ethically and still betray his
responsibility in essential respects, and in ways that no one will ever
know about. Increasing the number of rules and prohibitions-making
sure that judges don't attend conferences at swank resorts with plush
golf courses3 '-will do absolutely nothing to increase judicial
responsibility where it counts. To the contrary, the more rules you have,
the more hoops judges have to jump through to avoid the appearance of
impropriety, the more likely they are to feel that the hoop-jumping is the
alpha and omega of their ethical responsibilities, and the less likely they
are to give careful thought to the job's real ethical pitfalls.

30. See 5 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 101-102 (2004).
31.

See Joe Stephens, Judges' Free Trips Go Unreported: U.S. Jurists Say They Forgot To

Comply With Ethics Law, WASH. POST, June 30, 2000, at Al (noting that trips to judicial legal
seminars, accepted by judges as gifts, can be valued at $4500 per judge, and that certain groups
were calling for a ban on accepting such gifts).
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I know there is a growing tendency to distrust judges-to craft
more elaborate ethical rules and restrictions; to expand the scope of what
is encompassed within the appearance of impropriety standard; to adopt
more and better methods of intruding into judges' private lives-all in a
misguided effort to promote ethical judicial behavior. But the hard truth
is that none of these things really matters. Judicial ethics, where it
counts, is hidden from view, and no rule can possibly ensure ethical
judicial conduct. Ultimately, there is no choice but to trust the judges.
Maybe we need some external rules, maybe we don't. But, to my mind,
we'd all be better off in a world with fewer rules and a more clear-cut
understanding that impartiality and diligence are obligations that
permeate every aspect of judicial life--obligations that each judge has
the unflagging responsibility to police for himself.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/1

12

